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abstraCt
Demographic change is transforming the EU population structure for the coming decades. One 
challenge that society faces is to preserve social welfare when elderly persons comprise a larger 
proportion of the total population.  Allowing people to work beyond the current retirement age 
may help slow the growth of the maintenance burden for welfare costs, and creating situations 
where larger numbers of older employees can work longer and complete more working hours 
can improve conditions for preserving and developing welfare. However, a prolonged working life 
presupposes several conditions; one of these is that legal regulation of the labor market must sup-
port employers’ willingness to hire and retain older workers in employment.  This article explores 
employers’ attitudes toward regulations in Swedish collective agreements—regulations which 
are of particular importance if employers are to increase hiring and retention of older workers  
in employment.
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A rapidly ageing population is a challenge to many of today’s societies, and Sweden is no different (Nilsson 2012). One challenge is to preserve social welfare when the elderly make up a larger proportion of the total population (Report from the 
Parliament 2013/14:RFR8). Labor market institutions require people above the age of 
67 years to leave salaried employment. If these systems do not change, pension bene-
fits will be unreasonably low and the stability of the pensions system will be threatened 
(Ds 2013:8; Kruse 2010). Allowing people to work beyond the current retirement age 
limit can help slow the growth of the maintenance burden for welfare costs (Bengtsson 
and Scott 2010; Kadefors and Johansson Hanse 2012; Staubli and Zweiműller 2011). 
However, a prolonged working life presupposes several conditions; labor market regula-
tion, including collective agreements, must promote this development and employers must 
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be willing to hire and retain older people in their businesses. An international study by 
Manpower shows that of the companies surveyed, Swedish firms were the least prepared 
to give older workers employment or retain older employees in work (Manpower 2007). 
The Equality Ombudsman (DO) confirms in a report that older employees are discrimi-
nated in the Swedish labor market and that recruitment situations are particularly dis-
criminatory in this respect (DO 2012, see also Kadefors 2013). Against this background, 
it is interesting to investigate whether—and in what way—Swedish collective agreements 
support employers’ willingness to hire and retain older workers.
The Swedish Employment Protection Act (SEPA 1982:80) provides currently 
employed workers with protection. When terminating an employment, the employer 
must demonstrate just cause for termination and when choosing among employees 
for termination, the employer must also comply with a specified order of selection for 
termination. The labor market in Sweden is regulated to a large extent by collective 
agreements. This means that in many aspects, labor market parties can complement and 
replace parts of the current legislation, such as the order of selection for termination 
(22 § SEPA) through regulation in collective agreements. About 90% of all employees 
on the Swedish labor market are covered by collective agreements (Swedish National 
Mediation Office 2013). Collective agreements may exist on several levels; some agree-
ments are valid for a special sector and some are central, cross-industry collective agree-
ments (so-called main agreements). 
One welfare regulation in Sweden is the pension system. An employee’s pension can 
consist of a statutory pension, a collective agreement-based pension, and possibly the 
employee’s private pension provisions. There are four major collective agreement-based 
pension schemes for the Swedish labor market, and these occupational pensions in col-
lective agreements are important complements to the general statutory pension scheme 
(Statistic Sweden 2012 Transition from work to retirement). These agreements cover 
civil servants, municipal and county employees, and white-collar workers and blue- 
collar workers in the private sector, respectively. There are also collective agreements in 
the form of transition agreements which cover all sectors of the labor market (private 
and public, blue-collar, white-collar, and professional employees). The transition agree-
ments are an important complement to the statutory employment protection regulation 
on redundancy dismissals (see Walter 2015; Rönnmar 2014).
Approximately 90% of Swedish employers have no strategy to hire or retain older 
workers (Ds 2013:8). Combined with regulation in collective agreements, attitudes and 
experiences among employers may affect access to the labor market for elderly per-
sons and thus are important to examine in reference to Sweden’s changing demography. 
The collective agreements represent a central regulatory instrument in the relationship 
between employer and employee, and these agreements should rest to a large extent on 
the norms that form the basis of Swedish labor laws and on values found in the Swedish 
welfare model. Against this background, it is important to ensure that the regulation 
reflected in collective agreements harmonizes with the needs and challenges faced by the 
Swedish welfare society. The aim of this study was to interview employers to explore 
their experiences of regulations in collective agreements—regulations which can greatly 
influence their willingness to hire and retain older workers in employment. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a background about an age-
ing society; Section 3 describes the interview study itself; the results of the study are 
described in Section 4; and Section 5 presents a discussion of these results. 
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2 background: an ageing society
The Swedish welfare state—in the sense of all citizens’ rights to education, health 
care, social insurance, and assistance—is collectively funded through taxes and fees 
(Bengtsson and Scott 2011; Sundén et al. 2014). A broad tax base created through 
high labor force participation is therefore crucial to the funding of welfare services 
(Bengtsson 2010). Population development also has great significance for welfare 
(Ds 2013:8). The Swedish population has increased in recent years. During the fore-
cast period 2015–2060, the population is expected to increase by more than 3 million 
from 9.7 million in 2014 to 12.9 million in 2060. The group currently experiencing the 
strongest growth is that of people 65 years and older. From 2015 to 2060, the elderly 
population (65 years and older) is estimated to increase by 1.3 million people (Statistics 
Sweden Report 2015:2). Demographic developments in Sweden, with an increase in the 
ageing population, are shifting the economic dependency ratio for the working popula-
tion. In most economically developed countries, the share of working-age inhabitants is 
shrinking. The average exit age from the labor market in Sweden is one of the highest in 
the EU (Anxo 2010). From 2005 to 2030 the total working-age population (15–64 years 
old) in the EU is expected to fall by 20.8 million as the baby-boom cohorts retire (The 
EU Contribution to Active Aging and Solidarity between Generations 2012). A report 
from Statistics Sweden (SCB) presents different scenarios, regarding both the develop-
ment of the number of acquisition workers and the development of the maintenance 
burden until 2030. In a so-called zero scenario where native and foreign-born women 
and men in their respective one-year-class work as much in 2030 as they did in 2010, 
the maintenance burden would increase by almost 10% until 2030. This means that on 
average, every acquisition worker must support 2.35 persons including herself/himself 
(SCB Theme Report 2012:4). The EU would move from having four working-age people 
(aged 15–64) to support every person aged over 65 to a ratio of only two people to one 
elderly person (COM (2009)180 final). Another scenario illustrates situations where 
elderly people will work one, two, three, and four years longer than they do today. 
This implies that a 64-year-old in 2030 would work like a 60-year-old did in 2010 and 
a 65-year-old like a 61-year-old. None of the SCB’s scenarios assume that the mainte-
nance burden is on the same level as in 2010, but if elderly people did choose to work 
four years longer, the increase of the maintenance burden would be relatively marginal 
(Statistics Sweden 2012). Therefore, a labor force in which more elderly people work 
longer and complete more working hours would create better conditions for preserving 
and developing welfare (SOU 2012). 
The ageing population is growing not only in Sweden, but also throughout the 
EU. The life expectancy at birth for males is expected to increase by 7.1 years over the 
period 2013–2060 and for females it is projected to increase by 6.0 years, reaching 
89 in 2060 (European Commission 2015). The number of Europeans aged 65 and over 
is expected to increase by 45% between 2008 and 2030, and the elderly will make up 
more than 30% of the population by 2060 (FUTURAGE 2011). As a consequence of 
ageing populations, the need for public provisions of age-related transfers and ser-
vices will increase. Age-related public expenditure is projected to increase on average 
by about 4.75 percentage points of the EU’s gross domestic product by 2060 and by 
more than 5 percentage points in the Eurozone, especially through welfare services 
such as pensions, health care, and long-term care (COM 2009)180 final). This means 
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that it is important to increase employment rates substantially and encourage ageing 
baby-boomers to stay in the labor market instead of retiring early. Achieving such an 
objective requires increased orientation toward active-ageing policies and practices—a 
win–win strategy for people of all ages. Active ageing has been defined by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) as the process of optimizing opportunities for health, 
participation, and security in order to enhance quality of life as people age. It allows 
people to participate in society and the labor force (WHO 2002; COM (2010)462 
final). Core active-ageing practices include life-long learning, working longer, retir-
ing later, more gradually reducing activity after retirement, and engaging in capacity-
enhancing and health-sustaining activities (COM (2002)143 final). Active ageing is 
also the basis for solidarity between generations. In Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty, 
solidarity between generations is enshrined as a goal. In an economy in which fewer 
must work to sustain more people, there is a risk for conflicts between generations. 
One important way to counteract this is to ensure that elderly persons who are able 
are given the possibility to take charge of their own lives and contribute to society. The 
knowledge that the able elderly are contributing to society’s prosperity can increase 
acceptance and persuade the working population to demonstrate solidarity between 
generations; more can be done for those in society who are most dependent on support 
by others (The EU Contribution to Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations 
2012; Numhauser-Henning 2013).
The general aim of this study was to explore employers’ attitudes to regulation 
in collective agreements related to their willingness to hire or remain older workers in 
employment. An additional aim after the analysis of the interviews was to scrutinize 
regulations in central collective agreements that the employers referred to in their inter-
view responses.
The specific research questions were as follows:
•    What are employers’ experiences of how regulations in their specific central collec-
tive agreements affect their willingness to hire and retain older workers in employ-
ment?
•    Are the employers covered by a local collective agreement that affects their willing-
ness to hire and retain older workers in employment?
The study is based on social constructionist theory. One necessary approach to social 
constructionism is to maintain a critical view toward the self-evident knowledge of how 
we understand reality and ourselves. Our knowledge of the world is a product of how 
we categorize reality. Another starting point is that the ways in which we perceive and 
represent the world are historically and culturally specific and temporary. This means 
that how we understand the world through different concepts depends on where in the 
world we live, and the time in which we live. The third feature of social constructionism 
is that knowledge is maintained through social processes. What we interpret as knowl-
edge is produced through everyday social interaction—the influences between people—
in which we jointly build truths and fight for what is true or false. Yet a fourth point of 
view is that there is a connection between knowledge and social action. Various social 
worldviews lead to different social actions (Burr 2003). 
The evaluation of the interviews and the legal collective regulation had been done in 
light of the societal interest that employees work longer and with more working hours.
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3 Method
An interview study was performed at three manufacturing facilities and five companies 
in the service sector, all in different areas of Sweden. The companies’ workforces ranged 
from 29 to 1,100 employees. Only one company had more female than male employees. 
In the manufacturing companies studied, employees were mostly blue-collar workers 
with secondary school as their highest level of education; in all the service-sector compa-
nies except one, all employees were white-collar workers and the majority had a univer-
sity degree. The one service sector exception had a majority of blue-collar workers and 
most workers had secondary school as their highest level of education.
A strategic sampling of informants was done. The informants all worked in private 
companies, but in different sectors (manufacturing and service, respectively), in the posi-
tion of chief executive officer or managing director. This selection was based on several 
factors. First, people in such positions can greatly affect norms and decisions of compa-
nies as a whole. Sampling also reflected an ambition to interview both men and women, 
including at least one informant with a non-Swedish background. Yet another goal of 
the sampling was to ensure that informants could provide diverse views on the subject. 
A gatekeeper was used to aid in gaining access to informants. 
Of those interviewed, two were native Swedish women, one man was a second-
generation immigrant, and five were native Swedish men. For interviews with two of 
the manufacturing companies and one service-sector company, the respective manager 
of human resources (HR) participated together with the managerial director. One HR 
manager was a man and two were women. These people added some information and 
background to the respective managerial director’s responses.
Data were collected through the interviews with eight managerial directors in the 
private sector between August and November 2014 and in September 2015. The inter-
views were carried out on-site at the companies and lasted from one and a half to two 
hours. The interviews were semi-structured and thematically organized. The guide for 
a semi-structured interview included an outline of topics to be covered along with sug-
gested questions. The study itself determined whether the questions and their sequence 
are strictly predetermined and binding on the interviewers or whether the interviewers’ 
judgment and tact should govern how closely the guide was followed and how exten-
sively interviewers followed up the informants’ answers (Brinkman and Kvale 2014). 
Interviewers asked open-ended questions around the following themes: legal regulation 
with a focus on older workers; employers’ attitudes toward older workers, both gener-
ally and with a special focus on skills development; and serving public interest by per-
suading older employees to work longer, and how employers viewed this aspect.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim for deeper analysis. Infor-
mants received information in advance about the study and had consented to participate. 
One week before the interview, the informants received the semi-structured interview 
guide. The interviews were analyzed according to a content analysis method. Qualitative 
content analysis as outlined by Graneheim and Lundman (2004) was used to identify 
and explain the regulations in collective agreements that could affect employers’ willing-
ness to hire and retain older workers in business. In this approach the unit of analysis 
(in this study this unit was the interview text) and meaning units (words, sentences, or 
paragraphs containing aspects related to each other and the research question through 
their content and context) were selected from the original text. In the next step of the 
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process, codes were assigned to meaning units, and subcategories and categories were 
created to describe the manifest meaning of the data. 
To facilitate the process, the interviews were entered in OpenCode, a form of 
qualitative coding software. The interviews were read line by line and the text was 
broken down into parts. Each part was given a name (open coding) using concrete 
words close to those used in the interview text that describe an experience, opinion, 
or event. The content areas identified in the interviews were as follows: legal regula-
tion, employers’ attitudes to older workers, and employers’ attitudes specific to skills 
development. Open codes were then clustered and transferred into subcategories and 
categories according to selective coding. Finally, themes were constructed to interpret 
the latent meaning of informant experiences. An example of the analytical process is 
illustrated in Figure 1. The figure illustrates how meaning units were gradually con-
densed, how codes were sorted into tentative subcategories, and how the subcatego-
ries were grouped into respective categories that constituted the bases for generating 
a hypothesis.
Figure 1:  The analytical process moving from informant response quote to codes, subcategories, 
and categories.
Quote Meaning unit  Subcategories Categories
‘ … when it comes to pensions, 
and especially those for upper 
management, we have to consider 
the cost of pensions…’
‘… if we employ a person who 
has worked abroad, and who then 
moves back to Sweden and we 
hire that person, and come to 
agreement on a salary and other 
conditions, but then suddenly we 
realize that the pension cost will 
be very high indeed…the cost for 
us to make contributions can be 
enormous…’
‘… employers who have not paid  
100% of pension contributions…’
‘… very important to check these 
things beforehand…’




for people who 
have been employed 
abroad




new older workers 
Pension costs’ influ-
ence on willingness 
to employ
High pension costs 
for older white-collar 
workers
Require employers 
to make provisions  
in pensions to 
guarantee a certain 
pension level
Collective agreement 
poses an obligation 
on employers to pay
Pension costs are 
transferred to a new 
employer
Can be a barrier to 
older white-collar 
workers in getting  
a new job
Guarantee level  
of pension in a  
central collective 
agreement for  
white-collar workers
After the interviews the collective-agreement provisions, identified by the employers, 
were analyzed in accordance with traditional legal method, which involves analysis of 
the collective agreement in accordance with the parties’ common willingness or with 
wording of text. 
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4 results
In this study none of the interviewed employers stated that they had identified a reg-
ulation in collective agreements that stimulates their willingness to employ or retain 
older workers. However, employers did give examples of different regulations in collec-
tive agreements that facilitate the phasing out of older workers and factors that limit 
employers’ willingness to hire older workers. 
One result of the study was the generation of a hypothesis about occupational pen-
sion for white-collar workers. Another result was that employers appear to be posi-
tive to the regulation about working-time accounts because the provisions could give 
employees an opportunity to retire prior to the general retirement age limit. Even the 
provisions about part-time pension and transition agreements, according to the employ-
ers, facilitated decision-making with regard to terminating older workers’ employment. 
Below follows a more detailed account of the results.
Employment of the elderly and pension costs
The interviewed employers pointed out that the most important factor for them in 
recruitments was to hire the right person for the company. Against that background, the 
age of the applicant in principle did not matter. The person who was considered to be the 
‘right’ one was assessed according to an overall framework, where factors such as the 
physical and mental health of the applicant, as well as competence, personal characteris-
tics, wage demands, and the prognosis of the worker’s long-term value for the company 
were assessed. More than half of the interviewed employers stated, however, that they 
had incurred unexpectedly high pension costs when they had recruited an older white-
collar worker. This was seen as both an important and a limiting factor for employment 
of older workers. The informants stated that such situations could occur when previous 
employers made little or no pension contribution for the individual worker, and that the 
new employer must therefore compensate so that the white-collar worker could receive 
a certain pension at the age of 65. The informants gave examples in which this situation 
could arise, such as when an older white-collar worker had previously worked abroad, 
had worked for an employer without a collective agreement, or had been self-employed 
without making any pension contributions. This led to imposition of a larger burden on 
the new employer to cover the worker’s pension costs because the worker’s pension must 
be paid before he/she retires.
… in the cases where it’s been a challenge, we have hired someone who is 62 years old … 
and the pension contributions were quite high because that person had been employed by 
a company who did not pay out 100% for pension. As far as I know that hasn’t changed.
All of the informants stated that they were familiar with the collective-agreement regu-
lation on pensions which could require a new employer to make unreasonably high 
pension contributions when recruiting older workers. The informants stated that this 
circumstance could affect their willingness to employ older white-collar workers (see 
Johnson 2007). An informant pointed out that nowadays it is possible to measure a lot 
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of things, and awareness of total costs of every worker is essential for the company’s 
competiveness.
The informants’ experiences generated the following hypothesis: the current collec-
tive agreement based occupational pension of industry and trade, ITP2 pension regula-
tion scheme, which is a part of the central collective agreement for white-collar workers 
in the private sector, requires disproportionately high pension contributions when hiring 
an older employee compared with hiring a younger employee. As a result, this regulation 
reduces employers’ willingness to hire older employees.
Working-time accounts
One informant expressed the view that it was hoped that the provision about lifetime 
working in their central, industry-specific collective agreement would give workers an 
opportunity to retire under economically advantageous conditions, prior to the general 
retirement age. The informant expressed a wish regarding regulation of working-time 
reduction—that workers would continue working and contributing to pension premiums 
instead of collecting corresponding hours off. The company had informed the workers 
about the relatively large pension assets which could be reinvested if the worker made 
pension contributions according to the collective agreement from the age of 31. To fur-
ther stimulate workers to make pension contributions, a local collective agreement was 
concluded for the local workplace, which in addition to the central collective agreement 
meant extra compensation if the workers chose to set aside money for a future pension.
‘We prefer that employees put the money into pensions rather than take it out as time off…’ 
‘… we have added to, sweetened so to speak, this pension solution… “a very good offer 
which did not give a good result”…’ ‘ they are just so focused on time off right now…’
However, according to the informant, workers’ interest in making payments to the 
pension had been low. The workers preferred to use the reduction of working time for 
leisure. The local collective agreement did not persuade workers to choose the pen-
sion solution and therefore the local agreement was terminated. The only benefit that 
the informant observed for the agreement was that older workers could retire earlier 
with the funds from their pension contributions. Because the agreement did not give 
the desired result, the informant said that this regulation should not be included in the 
forthcoming central agreement because the reduction of working time would involve 
extra effort and higher costs in the local workplace, and provide little local benefit. 
Another informant stated that the central collective agreement for the company’s blue-
collar workers contained rules on working-life accounts. The purpose of a working-life 
account is to use a worker’s wage increase to reduce the work week, work year, or work 
life. The reduction of working time takes place through allocations to pension savings.
Part-time pension
Informants emphasized that the regulation of part-time pension in the central collective 
agreements for the industry including both blue- and white-collar workers particularly 
affects older workers.
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… we’d like employees to work longer, but on the other hand we often understand that 
this can wear on employees, on the whole. In that situation we have investigated and 
found part-time pension solutions, which in practice allow the employee to take part-time 
pension earlier, you see… and clearly this system mean that money must be pumped in 
for years, because we have to finance the cost somehow… but it also means we have that 
competence in-house longer, in the sense that the employee can stay and is able to handle 
working on a part-time basis.
The technology agreement gives workers an opportunity to apply for part-time pen-
sion and the collective agreement contributes to funding, partly through the worker’s 
own premiums, partly through the company making deposits into the worker’s pen-
sions. According to the informant, this practice facilitates skills transfer (Collective 
Agreement for wage-earners (Teknikavtalet) between Teknikarbetsgivarna and IF 
Metall; Collective Agreements for Salaried Workers (Teknikavtalet) between Teknikar-
betsgivarna and Unionen/Sveriges Ingenjörer/Ledarna). One informant had observed 
that more white-collar workers wanted to work beyond the age of 65. Informants see 
a difference between blue- and white-collar workers, in that the blue-collar worker has 
little desire to work longer than the statutory pension age. 
An informant complained that a system of part-time pension which affects older 
workers had been introduced in the collective agreement. White-collar workers can 
apply for part-time pension from the age of 62 and the employer must pay a premium 
for this purpose.
transition agreements
All but one of the informants who participated in the study were employed in work-
places covered by the transition agreement between the Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) and the Federation of Salaried Employees in Industry 
and Services (PTK). One workplace was for white-collar workers covered by the transi-
tion agreement between Fastigo and Unionen, SKTF, Ledarna, Sveriges Ingenjörer, SSR, 
Civilekonomerna, Jusek, and Sveriges Arkitekter. The informants were positive to the 
transition agreement for workers and felt that by supporting employees during their 
dismissal process, the agreement facilitated dismissals of permanently employed work-
ers. It was apparent from the interviews that except in the case of dismissals due to 
redundancy, the transition agreement was also used for dismissals that in reality were 
due to reasons relating to the individual employee concerned, but where the employee 
was formally dismissed due to redundancy. The worker received the benefit of the sup-
port provided by the transition agreement, and the informants felt that this approach 
facilitated the termination of the working relationship.
Some informants stated that the transition agreement should be complemented and 
should also be valid for dismissals related to the individual worker, especially when 
the employer determines that an employee has insufficient qualifications. Informants 
also pointed out that in the transition agreement for white-collar workers undergoing 
dismissals due to redundancy, the regulation was more competence-oriented than was 
required by the regulation in SEPA, and that this could affect the number of dismissals 
of older workers. SEPA states that when choosing employees for dismissal based on 
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redundancy, the employer must comply with a specified order of selection for termina-
tion. The position of individual employees regarding the order of selection is determined 
on the basis of length of service with the employer, known as the principle of ‘last in 
first out.’ However, for employees with a longer length of service, retaining a job also 
requires having sufficient qualifications for employment. The transition agreement offers 
the possibility for local agreements that give the employer the right to give the remaining 
available jobs to the most competent employees. Informants stated that length of service 
was more important for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers and that they 
found it was easier to discuss white-collar workers’ qualifications.
The informants also thought that the transition insurance (i.e., the transition agree-
ment for private-sector blue-collar workers) was valuable. The agreement was thought 
to facilitate dismissals of workers, when employers were able to offer dismissed employ-
ees transition insurance and aid for redevelopment (Transition insurance between the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation 2004; 
Transition insurance between Fastigo and LO 2005). In general, all of the informants of 
the service companies in the study stated that their companies had good financial status 
and that they could terminate employments by offering more generous settlement con-
ditions than required by collective agreements and the law. Therefore, informants con-
sidered themselves less dependent on transition agreements and said that in principle, 
current transition agreements were sufficient and that nothing was lacking that labor 
market parties needed to take up in a new transition agreement.
Wage-setting
The basic attitude of all of the informants was that in their central collective agreement 
for wages and general conditions of employment, there were no regulations that influ-
enced decisions to employ or retain older workers. One of the informants stated that 
it was not primarily a matter for the labor market parties; instead, this was an area to 
be taken in consideration by management in every company, because the message that 
management communicates to the company is often more important in determining the 
conditions that will prevail in that company. One informant stated that he appreciated 
the change to the central collective agreement with regard to wage-setting, in which the 
labor market parties have removed the lowest levels of wages and given more weight to 
the company’s financial strength in the process of wage determination. This creates new 
conditions: for example, elderly who are not able to perform tasks at previous levels can 
keep their employment, but must accept a lower wage. Another informant stated that 
the labor market parties should promote flexibility in wage determination so that wages 
can increase and decrease according to different phases of life.
… the possibility of making it easier for older employees. We have some older employees who 
clearly slowed their tempo towards the end of their employment, and it would have been 
good to have some kind of income adjustment, so to speak. Of course it’s not self-evident that 
every year of work will be equally productive and result in a salary increase; maybe you’ve 
peaked, maybe you worked your hardest during a period of your life and should have your 
highest salary at that time … then it shouldn’t be so strange to perhaps accept a reduction of 
10% towards the end, it’s not a foregone conclusion that every year means a pay rise.
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One informant emphasized that the doubled notice period for older workers who have 
longer length of service and a higher age was a factor affecting the willingness to employ 
older workers. The informant had experience of a dismissal of an older worker due to 
insufficient qualifications. The dismissal process, the informant stated, took an unrea-
sonably long time and the notice period according to the collective agreement was twice 
as long as that required by the rules of SEPA:
… we have been forced to let a person go, because she did not keep up in her competence 
development, and we had a shortage of work in that area; it was very difficult. And that 
affects attitudes towards older workers, perhaps in a negative way… it’s very difficult 
indeed … both that and the fact that we had notice periods of a year or more than a year.
regulation in local collective agreements and in  
unilateral employer documents 
One company’s informant said that within the group of companies, there are pension 
foundations which make it possible for employers to offer the pensions with favorable 
conditions, prior to the general retirement age. The informant’s opinion was that the 
pension foundation facilitates readjustments in the companies. White-collar workers 
can retire by agreement between 61 and 64 years of age, and then the employer has 
the possibility to recruit a worker with a better educational background. In principle, 
such a pension agreement should bring about rationalization in the business, but skills 
improvement is also possible with the support of funds in the pension foundation. It 
is the employer who unilaterally allows an employee to be offered a pension with the 
support of funds from the pension foundation. All of the interviewed employers talked 
about concluding agreements with individual employees for retirement and pension 
prior to the general age limit for retirement. The employer and the employee enter into 
an agreement about an earlier termination of work and the worker receives compensa-
tory wage and pension terms until the general age of retirement. According to the infor-
mants, this could occur both when the worker wanted to terminate his/her employment 
and when the employers wanted to terminate a worker’s employment prior to the age 
of retirement. The decision to offer an earlier termination with special conditions was 
always made unilaterally by the employer. 
None of the companies in the study had local competence development agreements, 
work environment agreements, transition agreements, or other local collective agree-
ments including regulations that the informants believed could affect their willingness to 
employ or retain older workers. All of the interviewed service-sector companies lacked 
local collective agreements. On the contrary, all the interviewed companies had a certain 
amount of unilaterally employer-established documentation, which served as policy doc-
uments for the business and which included (among other things) basic values, business 
approach, wage policy/wage criteria, performance appraisals, and the like. Employer 
documents could include statements about diversity concerning gender and ethnicity, 
but according to the informants, these documents did not include any statements of any 
special significance for older workers. One company had a unilateral employer decision 
document about bonuses. The bonus system was divided into four parts with a set goal 
per share. If the company as a whole achieved one or more of the goals, the company set 
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aside money for every worker in a pension-sharing foundation. The bonuses were to be 
deposited in the fund for at least three years and the employee could claim their funds 
from the age of 60.
5 Discussion
None of the employers identified regulations in collective agreements that increased 
their willingness to employ or retain older workers. Instead they pointed out provi-
sions that supported employees’ earlier retirement from the labor market and rules in 
collective agreements that could counteract employers’ willingness to employ older 
white-collar workers. Employers’ attitudes toward regulations in collective agree-
ments indicate that the need for longer working lives is not viewed as a priority by 
employers or trade unions. How can the problem of the welfare state’s growing main-
tenance burden be solved if the social partners do not make it a priority to manage the 
challenges accompanying an ageing population, and the government—in accordance 
with the Swedish model—chooses not to intervene?
Collective agreements are an important regulatory tool in the relationship between 
employers and employees. The power with which the labor market parties regulate the 
conditions concerning employers and employees also affects the community at large and 
requires the parties to be globally oriented and to take responsibility for the challenges 
facing Swedish welfare society. A problem for all EU Member States is the demographic 
development of an increasingly ageing population. A larger number of older people 
place a greater maintenance burden on the working population. It may be noted that 
evidence suggests that early retirement policies have not generated jobs for younger age 
groups (Dewhurst 2013). The increasing maintenance burden is not expected to be elim-
inated only through migration, increasing birth rates, shift of responsibility to family 
members, or increased taxes (Bengtsson and Scott 2011). If greater numbers of elderly 
persons were able to work longer and enjoy a higher employment rate, better conditions 
would be created to maintain and develop Swedish welfare society. This presupposes, 
however, that there are employers who want older workers in their businesses and that 
labor market regulation supports such an approach among employers. 
The interviews showed that compared with blue-collar employees, white-collar 
workers demonstrate more interest in working after 65 years of age (see Kadefors 2013). 
Most studies show that the higher a person’s education level, the later the person leaves 
the workforce (Sjögren Lindquist and Wadensjö 2009). Regulations in collective agree-
ments that support retiring later and working more hours presuppose that both employ-
ers and employees and their organizations really do want this to happen. If workers 
want to retire earlier or reduce their working hours, and employers see only advantages 
in replacing older workers with younger ones and are prepared to pay to achieve it, col-
lective agreements do not serve as a tool to satisfy society’s interest promoting a longer 
working life. With the current pension system a worker’s lifetime earnings are decisive 
for the pension the individual receives. In my view, it is important that the labor market 
parties vigorously communicate society’s need for employees to work longer and that 
social partners create conditions in collective agreements so that all employees have 
working conditions and terms allowing them to work longer than is currently the case 
(see SOU 2011:5).
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Employment of the elderly and pension costs
One finding from the interviews was that some pension terms regulated by collective 
agreement actually limit employers’ willingness to employ older white-collar workers. 
It is important to point out that the interviewed employers did not think that it was the 
older worker who was the problem; instead they cited the legal collective-agreement 
regulation. According to the employers, in some cases this regulation resulted in dispro-
portionately high pension costs for the employer. The employers stated that expensive 
pension costs could result if a white-collar worker had worked abroad, had worked for 
an employer without a collective agreement, or had been self-employed without making 
pension contributions. 
For white-collar workers in the private sector, the collective agreement-based sup-
plementary insurance is called the ITP plan, that is, the supplementary pension of indus-
try and trade. The ITP plan of today includes two parts: ITP1 (premium based) and 
ITP2 (benefit based). An analysis of the interviewed employers’ experiences resulted in 
a hypothesis: under certain conditions ITP2—the defined-benefit occupational pension 
for white-collar workers in the private sector—can put unreasonably high demands on 
pension contributions for a new employer when recruiting older white-collar workers. 
This hypothesis will be tested in a forthcoming article.
Working-time accounts and part-time pensions
One result of the interviews was that the employers viewed the regulation of working-
time accounts and part-time pensions, which is stipulated in central collective agree-
ments, as a driving force for workers to retire earlier than the general statutory age of 
retirement (Swedish guarantee pension is paid out from the age of 65, but according 
to the Swedish Employment Protection Act a worker has the right to remain employed 
until the age of 67). There is no provision in the central collective agreement concerning 
the purpose of the working-time account, but this feature results in a decrease of every 
worker’s required weekly working hours. The regulation in the collective agreement 
means that working-time accounts are set up individually for every worker. For every 
working-time account, time is allocated, calculated for each calendar year. The founda-
tion for this is the wage which has been paid during the calendar year in question. It 
is possible for the worker to receive the time ‘deposited’ in the working-time account 
as paid time off, a pension premium, or cash. According to collective agreements, to 
stimulate workers to make pension contributions, the company should contribute an 
additional 20% of the portion of the dedicated amount which is used for pension pro-
visions, in addition to the portion of the dedicated amount which the workers use for 
a pension premium. Workers also have the right each year to use the corresponding 
amount to accrue compensatory leave for a pension contribution (Collective Agreement 
between the Swedish Forest Industries Federation and the Swedish Papers Workers’ 
Union 2013–2016).
The collective agreement between Fastigo and Fastighetsanställdas förbund included 
provisions about working-life accounts. The provisions mean that a portion of the indi-
vidual’s monthly salary is allocated for each contract year. This allocation, according 
to agreement between the employer and the employee, may be used to increase salary, 
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contribute to a pension, or reduce working hours. The details of working accounts shall 
be determined at the local level. At the workplace included in the study, the local parties 
had not signed a local agreement about working-life accounts. 
The central collective agreements about part-time pension show that by reduc-
ing working time, the provisions in the collective agreement aim to create a situa-
tion where employees work longer. The collective agreements give workers the right, 
from the month they turn 60 years old, to apply for part-time pension for retirement 
purposes. The local employer can reject the application for part-time pension if an 
objective assessment reveals that approval of the request would cause considerable 
interference in work activities (Collective Agreement for wage-earners (Teknikavtalet 
between Teknikarbetsgivarna and IF Metall; Collective Agreements for Salaried Work-
ers (Teknikavtalet) between Teknikarbetsgivarna and Unionen/Sveriges Ingenjörer/
Ledarna)). According to the parties, the basis for the provisions is that workers will 
work longer in the future and that many will suffer the effects of ageing; more work 
will mean they simply must work less at the end of their professional lives (Mutual 
commentary of the parties, Confirmation of Agreement between Teknikarbetsgivarna 
and IF Metall 2013). The parties have agreed to contribute with financing of part-
time pensions through payments of individual pension premiums. According to a mes-
sage from IF Metall, it is clear that the parties have agreed on a reduction of working 
time, which is converted to a pension premium for financing workers’ part-time pen-
sion (Teknikavtalet IF Metall—Agreement on a New Collective Agreement 2013). It is 
apparent from the collective agreement for white-collar workers that the parties have 
agreed upon increasing pension payments through extra payments to ITPK or alterna-
tively ITP1 to make it easier for those who want to receive part-time pension. During 
the agreement period, payments are to increase successively to a total of 0.6% of the 
pensionable wage (Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers, Agreement informa-
tion for elected representatives within the scope of Teknikavtalet). The agreement for 
white-collar workers also shows that the employer, upon granting a part-time pension, 
should also report income based on the worker’s earlier employment rate, if the worker 
is covered by the ITP2-defined benefit occupational pension (Collective Agreement for 
Salaried Workers (Teknikavtalet) between Teknikarbetsgivarna and Unionen/Sveriges 
Ingenjörer/Ledarna). My interpretation of this provision is that it aims to protect the 
worker’s future pension, because according to ITP2, this future pension is based on 
the worker’s wage at the time of retirement. In Teknikavtalet (a collective agreement) 
for both blue- and white-collar workers it is apparent that if the local parties do not 
agree otherwise, working time exceeding 100 hours at year end is to be replaced with 
an amount which corresponds to wage per hour. This amount is then to be paid as a 
premium to pension insurance for the individual worker (Collective Agreement for 
wage-earners (Teknikavtalet) between Teknikarbetsgivarna and IF Metall; Collective 
Agreements for Salaried Workers (Teknikavtalet) between Teknikarbetsgivarna and 
Unionen/Sveriges Ingenjörer/Ledarna). 
Judging from the central collective agreement between Fastigo and Unionen, 
Ledarna, Akademikerförbundet SSR, Civilekonomerna, Jusek, and Sveriges Arkitekter, 
it appears that the parties have introduced a system of partial pension. The system gives 
white-collar workers the right to apply for part-time pension from the age of 62. The 
employer must contribute to part-time retirement in the form of a premium. The pre-
mium is 0.2% of payroll from 1 April 2014 to 31 March 2015. From 1 April 2015, the 
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premium increased to 0.5%. The aim of the regulation is to provide opportunities for a 
longer working life and create a prerequisite for alternation generations.
As I understand it, the provisions for reduction of hours of work and part-time 
pension mean that the labor market parties want to create the conditions required so 
that workers can take pensions earlier than is possible with statutory funding. This 
approach, as I see it, works against society’s need to have employees remain longer in 
work. Instead, when needed, the allocated funds should also be feasible for use in facili-
tating workers’ transitions to new work tasks with the current employer or to the labor 
market as a whole. This approach would make it possible for employees to work longer. 
The purpose of the regulation of part-time pension is built on an idea that older work-
ers do not have the same productivity, energy, competence, or motivation as younger 
workers. This is a general notion held by older workers; as far as I know, there is no sci-
entific support for this belief. The parties therefore choose to solve individual problems 
on a structural level. Another approach is to try to create a more flexible working life, 
where it is possible to move between different positions and where workers are given 
more opportunity to take responsibility for their employability at a later age. Workers 
of today know that longer lifetime earnings result in a higher pension. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that workers will want to plan for an earlier retirement—they will want to retire 
later than is generally the case today. One way to realize longer working lives could be 
to set up individual skills development accounts. Today, employers allocate money for 
(among other things) reduction of working hours, part-time pension solutions, and tran-
sition agreements. Together with state co-financing, these funds can create conditions 
for workers to develop skills for new trades instead of focusing on earlier retirement 
from the labor market, if a situation arises where the worker’s current employment is no 
longer feasible. It is likely that the individual worker is the first to know whether his/her 
qualifications are sufficient to continue working in the current position at higher age, 
and is thus the person best able to take responsibility and any necessary action. At best, 
giving individuals responsibility for their skills development achievements could mean a 
longer working life for those who need to shift to a different working scenario. 
transition agreements
All of the interviewed employers were covered by transition agreements. The transition 
agreements show that these employers want to facilitate transition for both compa-
nies and for workers, when development measures, restructuring, rationalizations, and 
unprofitability create redundancy. The employers pay fees for a worker’s insurance and 
transitions. According to the agreements, the redundant worker should receive both 
economic assistance and support in finding new employment. These agreements make 
it clear that the parties all subscribe to the same notion: companies with redundancies 
due to shortage of work should be afforded staffing conditions that promote continued 
business the greatest degree possible. When selecting workers for dismissals the local 
parties should adapt this selection based on the company’s competence needs as well as 
the company’s capacity to maintain a competitive business, and thereby offer continued 
employment to other employees. The transition agreements currently in place in the labor 
market come into play only when a worker is informed that he/she will be dismissed. 
This means that the transition aid enters late in the process, and the agreement is built 
76 Swedish Collective Agreements and Employers’ Carin Ulander-Wänman
on the idea that something external to the worker should resolve the situation. At that 
point a worker has little chance of being able to acquire new skills or otherwise affect 
the current redundancy. What is needed is a legal regulation based on a view of human 
beings as workers who are active, willing, competent, and autonomous legal entities, as 
a way to create the right conditions for giving individual workers greater power over 
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